September 23, 2025
In recent months, the detention of Varna Mayor Blagomir Kotsov and Sofia Deputy Mayor Nikola Barbutov on corruption charges has raised serious questions about the conduct of the court, the prosecution, lawyers, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), non-governmental organizations, and the media. The media, NGOs, and lawyers analyze and ask questions, but instead of answering these questions, the institutions remain silent or, as the Judicial College of the SJC did, call on the public to have blind „faith in the rule of law.“ In a series of publications, Electronic Judge examines the main problems recurring in the aforementioned proceedings, which have been identified for a long time but remain festering sores in our judicial system: lack of safeguards against abuse of investigative secrecy, recusals, secondments in the judicial system, lack of or double standards in assessing the imposition of pre-trial detention. There is a worrying trend that institutions, as well as many professionals in the system, refuse to discuss the essence of these problems.
There have already been two recusals in the case before the Sofia Court of Appeals, as the second instance for reviewing the preventive measure against Varna Mayor Blagomir Kotsov. On September 17, 2025, the entire panel of judges who were to rule on the continued detention of the mayor accused of corruption recused themselves. Appellate judges Alexander Zhelyazkov, Atanaska Kitipova, and Desislav Lyubomirov stated that because of the subject matter of the case, an unprecedented negative campaign was being waged against every judge involved, and that biased, manipulative, and false allegations of existing dependencies were being spread in society. A day later, Judge Georgi Ushev also recused himself, citing that members of the law firm defending Kotsov had in recent years „taken various actions“ against Ushev in his capacity as a judge, „including filing a complaint requesting disciplinary action.“ Thus, Ushev became the fourth magistrate to refuse to rule on Kotsov’s request in the second instance. It is known that his defense attorney is Ina Lulcheva from the law firm „Dokovska, Atanasov and Partners.“ The DeFacto website highlights the facts surrounding the request for disciplinary action against Ushev. His reasons for recusal do not make it clear which of the attorneys at the „Dokovska, Atanasov and Partners“ law firm is defending Kotsov. It is not clear from his reasons for recusal which of the lawyers at the law firm „Dokovska, Atanasov and Partners“ he is referring to, but in view of the objections raised by attorney Ina Lulcheva in the case of the detention of the mayor of Varna, it is likely that he is referring to her. Ina Lulcheva in the case of the detention of the Varna mayor and the recusal of the previous panel of judges from the case, it became clear that it was Lulcheva who had affected the judicial independence of Georgi Ushev. However, this suggestion is incorrect: in 2021, it was not attorney Lulcheva, but attorney Vasil T. Vasilev who requested disciplinary sanctions against Georgi Ushev. The signal was sent for a statement on the BTV program „Face to Face,“ in which Georgi Ushev (at that time) The signal was sent for a statement in the BTV program „Face to Face,“ in which Georgi Ushev (at that time president of the Specialized Court of Appeal) announced the proceedings against Rumen Ovcharov on charges related to the „Mini Bobov Dol“ case as a success for the specialized judiciary, expressing satisfaction with the outcome of the case and hope that the sentence will not be changed. The problem is that at the time of Ushov’s television statement, the criminal proceedings against Ovcharov were pending before the appellate court, headed by Georgi Ushov, and the verdict had not yet been handed down. It was announced a month later, which, according to attorney Vasilev, shows that Ushev not only stated untrue circumstances, but also gave a clear indication of what the decision of his subordinates should be. but also gave a clear indication of what the decision of his subordinate judges should be. The president of the SJC (at that time Lozan Panov) imposed a penalty on Ushov at the request of attorney Vasil Vasilev, but the BCC overturned it. Panov appealed the reversal before the SAC, but after becoming president of the SJC, he withdrew his appeal. Panov appealed the revocation before the SAC, but after Zakharova became head of the SJC, she withdrew her predecessor’s appeal. Thus, Judge Ushov got away with punishment. On April 1, 2025 (25 years after the initiation of the pre-trial proceedings), the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office terminated the Bobov Dol case against Rumen Ovcharov due to the initial lack of evidence of a crime.
Recusals in criminal cases are regulated by Article 29 of the Penal Procedure Code, according to which a judge or juror may not participate in the composition of the court: 1. who has participated in the composition of the court that has ruled: a) a sentence or decision in the first, appellate, or cassation instance, or in the reopening of the criminal case; b) a ruling approving an agreement to settle the case; c) a ruling terminating the criminal proceedings; 2. who has conducted an investigation in the case; 3. who was a prosecutor in the case; 4. who was a defendant, guardian or custodian of the defendant, defense counsel or attorney in the case; 5. who was or could have been a party to the criminal proceedings as a private prosecutor, private complainant, civil claimant or civil defendant; 6. who has been a witness, guarantor, expert witness, interpreter, Bulgarian sign language interpreter, or specialist technical assistant in the case; 7. who is the spouse or close relative of the persons referred to in points 1 to 6; 8. who is the spouse or close relative of another member of the court. The judge must recuse himself from hearing a criminal case if there are circumstances that may directly or indirectly cast doubt on his impartiality. Requests for recusal must be considered immediately by the court, which must give reasons for its decision (Article 31(3) and (4) of the CPC). The CPC does not provide for the possibility of challenging these decisions separately from the decision on the merits of the criminal case. However, according to the established practice of the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation, the lack of impartiality of the criminal court is considered a substantial procedural violation, which justifies the reversal of the contested decision on appeal and the subsequent referral of the case back to the lower court for a new trial (Decision No. 245 of 8 May 1996 on Case No. 545/1995, I n. o.; Decision No. 523 of 13 July 2005 of the Supreme Court of Cassation on Case No. 988/2004, II n. o., NC; Decision No. 43 of 13 May 2019 of the Supreme Court of Cassation on Case No. 51/2019, III n. o., NK).
The recusals of the four appellate judges on overly general grounds come against the backdrop of a long-standing trend of increasing numbers of judicial recusals, both in the specific court and nationwide. A check in the Electronic Public Register of Recusals (EPR) shows that as a judge in the Sofia Court of Appeal, Georgi Ushev has recused himself a total of nine times, seven of them this year. From the beginning of the year to date (September 23, 2025), there have been a total of 685 recusals in the Sofia Court of Appeals, compared to a total of 367 in 2024 and 297 in 2023. Nationwide, recusals in cases are also on the rise: in 2025, there have been 27,430 so far, while in 2024 there were 27,826, in 2023 – 22,287, and in 2022 – 17,631.
Another landmark case that was delayed and thus suffered from judicial recusals is the „Deborah“ case, which was delayed by at least a year due to the mass recusals of judges from the District Court in Stara Zagora and later from the District Court in Plovdiv.
The recusals even reached the Strasbourg court in connection with journalist Rosen Boshev’s complaint against Bulgaria. In his case, the problem was not a recusal based on overly general grounds, but rather a lack of recusal in the face of very specific grounds for recusal – the municipal court judge Petya Krancheva, who convicted Boshev, refused to recuse herself, even though she had been the subject of critical publications by the journalist on more than one occasion. According to the ECHR ruling, a national procedure in which the judge personally rules on a recusal request is in accordance with the Convention on Human Rights only in exceptional cases – when the grounds for the recusal request are general, abstract and clearly abusive. Otherwise, the judge takes on the role of judging himself, which is contrary to a fundamental principle of law. The shortcomings of the recusal procedure can, in principle, be remedied by the higher court – it can overturn the judgment and refer the case to another panel. However, there are cases, such as that of Rosen Boshev, where the recusal is refused by the court of last instance.
Challenges in criminal cases must be justified (Art. 31, para. 3, Art. 47, para. 3 of the Penal Procedure Code). The requirement to justify challenges and self-recusals in civil cases is not so explicitly stated.
Challenges in administrative, civil, and commercial proceedings are regulated by Article 22 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to which a person may not participate as a judge in a case if they: 1. are a party to the case or, together with one of the parties to the case, are a subject of the disputed or related legal relationship; 2. is a spouse or relative in a direct line without restriction, in a collateral line up to the fourth degree or by marriage up to the third degree of any of the parties or their representative; 3. lives in a de facto marital relationship with a party to the case or their representative; 4. who has been a representative or proxy of a party to the case; 5. who has participated in the resolution of the case in another instance or has been a witness or expert in the case; 6. in respect of whom there are other circumstances that give rise to reasonable doubt as to his or her impartiality. The judge is obliged to recuse himself in the cases under points 1 to 5, and when he does not accept the recusal under paragraph 1, point 6, he must disclose the circumstances.
Elektronski Sudnik recalls that in 2023, supreme judges requested an interpretative case on the „other“ grounds for recusal in civil and commercial cases. The questions that gave rise to conflicting case law were formulated as follows:
- „Is the participation of a judge in a previous case, in which an opinion was given on the same evidence presented in the current pending case, or a ruling on a matter relevant to the outcome of the pending case, a ground for recusal under Article 22(1)(6) of the Civil Procedure Code?“
- „Is there a defect in a court decision rendered by a panel of judges in the presence of circumstances under Article 22(1)(6) of the Civil Procedure Code, and if so, what is it?
The request was rejected (see below Decision No. 1 of 21.11.2023 in interpretative case No. 1/2023 of the Supreme Court of Cassation) on the grounds that an interpretation in that sense would lead to an inadmissible addition or amendment to the provision of Article 22 of the Civil Procedure Code by way of interpretation. According to the supreme judges, „it is objectively impossible to give a principled answer to the question raised – to accept that the participation of a judge in a previous case, in which an opinion has been given on evidence presented in both cases, or there has been a ruling on a matter relevant to the outcome of the pending case, in all cases and regardless of the circumstances and specifics of the case, is or is not a ground for recusal under Article 22(1)(6) of the Civil Procedure Code. This objective impossibility is a consequence of the dependence of the assessment of the existence of grounds under Article 22(1)(6) of the Civil Procedure Code on a number of specific circumstances that could not be foreseen and analysed in the interpretative procedure (e.g., various arguments, objections, and challenges raised by the parties in each of the cases; procedural actions taken or not taken by the parties in each of the cases—requests for evidence, challenges to documents, admissions of facts and/or disputed substantive rights, etc.; binding case law established in the meantime on the relevant legal issue examined in the previous case, with which the panel is obliged to comply, or resolution by a final decision rendered between the parties to the case on a legal issue examined in the previous case and prejudicial to the legal dispute that is the subject of the subsequent case. Any of these circumstances could be relevant in assessing whether the judge’s participation in a previous case, in which an opinion was expressed on a legal issue and on evidence identical to that presented in the second case, raises doubts as to the impartiality of the decision in the second case. There will be no such doubt and no grounds for recusal under Article 22(1)(6) of the Civil Procedure Code if, in the previous case, a document was found to be false, but in the subsequent case the same document is not challenged under Article 193 of the Civil Procedure Code, if on the legal issue discussed by the panel in the previous case, which is also relevant to the second case, binding case law has already been established, with which the panel is obliged to comply, if between the parties to the second case the preliminary legal issue discussed in the previous case by the judge has already been resolved by a final court decision.“
An analysis of the grounds for recusal in criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings shows that, although there are terminological differences in the texts of the two procedural laws, they regulate three types of grounds for recusal:
- Grounds based on family ties;
- Grounds based on the re-examination of the subject matter of the same legal dispute;
- Other grounds – hindering the issuance of an impartial, objective, and fair judicial act.
There is no public data available to allow for an analysis of the application of the third, most abstractly formulated group of grounds. The decisions by which a judge recuses himself from proceedings are not subject to separate appeal. Nor are the acts by which a judge refuses to recuse himself from proceedings subject to appeal.
The conclusion that must be drawn, given the many problems and questions raised by recusals in cases „due to other circumstances,“ is the need for legislative intervention to create a mechanism and guarantees against abuse of the institution of recusal.